fix(security): prevent CWE-134 format string injection
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- add "%s" to unsafe cons_show/log_*/win_println calls - add check-cwe134.sh static analysis script - integrate security check into CI pipeline Closes #85
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@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ _handle_error(xmpp_stanza_t* const stanza)
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g_string_append(log_msg, " error=");
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g_string_append(log_msg, err_msg);
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log_info(log_msg->str);
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log_info("%s", log_msg->str);
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g_string_free(log_msg, TRUE);
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