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T02: guard the receive-path handlers that dereferenced jid_create() without a NULL check — MUC join errors, subscribed/unsubscribed presence and, with silence.non-roster enabled, every incoming message. A stanza with a missing or malformed 'from' crashed the client. The XEP-0280 carbon path carried the same class twice: the forwarded message's 'from' was handed to xmpp_jid_bare(), which dereferences the jid it is given, and a malformed 'to' left the carbon dispatch dereferencing a NULL jid_create() result (REQ-INP-01) T11: restrict /url open and /url save to http, https and aesgcm, so a received file:, javascript: or data: URL is refused (REQ-INP-06); spawn terminal-notifier through g_spawn_async with an argv instead of building a shell command for system() (REQ-INP-07); apply the XEP-0359 disco gate to MAM result ids, as live stanza-ids already do (REQ-INP-05); replace control and bidi-reordering characters in incoming message bodies with U+FFFD before they reach the terminal, the logs and the database, keeping LRM/RLM for legitimate RTL text. That pass now runs on every display path: the OX one, where the call had been left commented out since the feature landed, and outgoing carbons, whose body is forwarded by the server (REQ-INP-08); cover JID part-length boundaries and invalid UTF-8 (REQ-INP-02) T10: replace strcpy/strcat/alloca and sprintf with g_strdup_printf and g_snprintf (REQ-MEM-03); allocate the OMEMO key buffers with g_malloc so a failed allocation cannot reach the following memcpy (REQ-MEM-04); remove the variable-length arrays and enforce -Werror=vla. Two of them were sized from remote input: the disco#info feature count and a chat message word length. The flag also caught a one-past-the-end write and a leak in the plugin autocompleter bindings (REQ-MEM-09). The OX receive path leaked every decrypted body, dropping the pointer instead of freeing it, and a failed strdup no longer costs the message body
9 lines
354 B
C
9 lines
354 B
C
void send_enable_carbons(void **state);
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void connect_with_carbons_enabled(void **state);
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void send_disable_carbons(void **state);
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void receive_carbon(void **state);
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void receive_self_carbon(void **state);
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void receive_private_carbon(void **state);
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void carbon_missing_forwarded_from_no_crash(void **state);
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void carbon_invalid_to_no_crash(void **state);
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