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T03 — keep secrets out of profanity.log: - new redact_secrets() helper (common.c) masks the content of SASL auth/response/challenge/success and <password> elements; applied in the libstrophe logger (_xmpp_file_logger) and the stderr-to-log bridge (REQ-DAR-03, REQ-LOG-06) - _add_to_db() no longer logs decrypted message bodies or the full INSERT statement (REQ-DAR-03) T07 — owner-only permissions on key material and history (REQ-AUTH-01): - chmod 0600 on chatlog.db after open (journal/WAL files inherit) - chmod 0600 on OTR keys.txt and fingerprints.txt after every write - parent dirs are already 0700 (create_dir); this is defense in depth T08 — integrity before trust: - PRAGMA quick_check(1) gates every chatlog.db open; on failure the DB stays closed, the user is warned once in the console and the session continues without history (REQ-RES-02) - OMEMO aesgcm downloads decrypt into a 0600 tempfile next to the target and rename it into place only after the GCM tag verifies; the open-command hook no longer runs on failed decryption (REQ-CRY-06) Tests: redact_secrets unit tests; AES-256-GCM roundtrip and tampered-tag/ciphertext unit tests (crypto.c now linked into unittests under BUILD_OMEMO); functional test planting a corrupt chatlog.db and asserting graceful degradation. Closes #146