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feat: Provide descriptive fallback messages for OMEMO decryption failures

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If an incoming OMEMO message failed to decrypt (due to missing session
keys or untrusted identities), Profanity would fall back to displaying
the raw XMPP body. This usually contained a generic string like "This
message is encrypted with OMEMO,".

We wrote the detailed reason in the debug logs but the user only saw the
fallback message and probably wondered *why* the message wasn't
displayed properly.

I'm unsure if we should display the fallback message as well though.
This commit is contained in:
Michael Vetter
2026-03-07 00:31:44 +01:00
parent b20e3f1a0c
commit 4d49c2b746
7 changed files with 169 additions and 12 deletions
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34
src/omemo/omemo.c
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@@ -1014,13 +1014,21 @@ out:
char*
omemo_on_message_recv(const char* const from_jid, uint32_t sid,
const unsigned char* const iv, size_t iv_len, GList* keys,
const unsigned char* const payload, size_t payload_len, gboolean muc, gboolean* trusted)
const unsigned char* const payload, size_t payload_len, gboolean muc, gboolean* trusted, omemo_error_t* error)
{
unsigned char* plaintext = NULL;
auto_jid Jid* sender = NULL;
auto_jid Jid* from = jid_create(from_jid);
if (error) {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_NONE;
}
if (!from) {
log_error("[OMEMO][RECV] Invalid jid %s", from_jid);
if (error) {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_INVALID_JID;
}
return NULL;
}
@@ -1036,6 +1044,9 @@ omemo_on_message_recv(const char* const from_jid, uint32_t sid,
if (!key) {
log_warning("[OMEMO][RECV] received a message with no corresponding key");
if (error) {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_NO_KEY;
}
return NULL;
}
@@ -1052,6 +1063,9 @@ omemo_on_message_recv(const char* const from_jid, uint32_t sid,
g_list_free(roster);
if (!sender) {
log_warning("[OMEMO][RECV] cannot find MUC message sender fulljid");
if (error) {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_MUC_SENDER_NOT_FOUND;
}
return NULL;
}
} else {
@@ -1069,6 +1083,9 @@ omemo_on_message_recv(const char* const from_jid, uint32_t sid,
res = session_cipher_create(&cipher, omemo_ctx.store, &address, omemo_ctx.signal);
if (res != 0) {
log_error("[OMEMO][RECV] cannot create session cipher");
if (error) {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_NO_SESSION;
}
return NULL;
}
@@ -1127,13 +1144,23 @@ omemo_on_message_recv(const char* const from_jid, uint32_t sid,
session_cipher_free(cipher);
if (res != 0) {
log_error("[OMEMO][RECV] cannot decrypt message key");
log_error("[OMEMO][RECV] cannot decrypt message key: %d", res);
if (error) {
if (!*trusted) {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED;
} else {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_DECRYPT_FAILED;
}
}
return NULL;
}
if (signal_buffer_len(plaintext_key) != AES128_GCM_KEY_LENGTH + AES128_GCM_TAG_LENGTH) {
log_error("[OMEMO][RECV] invalid key length");
signal_buffer_free(plaintext_key);
if (error) {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_DECRYPT_FAILED;
}
return NULL;
}
@@ -1146,6 +1173,9 @@ omemo_on_message_recv(const char* const from_jid, uint32_t sid,
if (res != 0) {
log_error("[OMEMO][RECV] cannot decrypt message: %s", gcry_strerror(res));
free(plaintext);
if (error) {
*error = OMEMO_ERR_DECRYPT_FAILED;
}
return NULL;
}